========================== Django 1.7.7 release notes ========================== *March 18, 2015* Django 1.7.7 fixes several bugs and security issues in 1.7.6. Denial-of-service possibility with ``strip_tags()`` =================================================== Last year :func:`~django.utils.html.strip_tags` was changed to work iteratively. The problem is that the size of the input it's processing can increase on each iteration which results in an infinite loop in ``strip_tags()``. This issue only affects versions of Python that haven't received :bpo:`a bugfix in HTMLParser <20288>`; namely Python < 2.7.7 and 3.3.5. Some operating system vendors have also backported the fix for the Python bug into their packages of earlier versions. To remedy this issue, ``strip_tags()`` will now return the original input if it detects the length of the string it's processing increases. Remember that absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of ``strip_tags()`` being HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a ``strip_tags()`` call without escaping it first, for example with :func:`~django.utils.html.escape`. Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs ============================================================= Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g. ``django.contrib.auth.views.login()`` and :doc:`i18n `) to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) accepted URLs with leading control characters and so considered URLs like ``\x08javascript:...`` safe. This issue doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put this URL into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore JavaScript there. Browsers we tested also treat URLs prefixed with control characters such as ``%08//example.com`` as relative paths so redirection to an unsafe target isn't a problem either. However, if a developer relies on ``is_safe_url()`` to provide safe redirect targets and puts such a URL into a link, they could suffer from an XSS attack as some browsers such as Google Chrome ignore control characters at the start of a URL in an anchor ``href``. Bugfixes ======== * Fixed renaming of classes in migrations where renaming a subclass would cause incorrect state to be recorded for objects that referenced the superclass (:ticket:`24354`). * Stopped writing migration files in dry run mode when merging migration conflicts. When ``makemigrations --merge`` is called with ``verbosity=3`` the migration file is written to ``stdout`` (:ticket:`24427`).